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Opportunity Discovery, Entrepreneurial Action, and Economic Organization 
 
 
Entrepreneurship is one of the fastest-growing fields within economics, management, fi-
nance, and even law. Surprisingly, however, while the entrepreneur is fundamentally an eco-
nomic agent—the “driving force of the market,” in Mises’s (1949, p. 249) phrase—modern theo-
ries of economic organization and strategy maintain an ambivalent relationship with entrepre-
neurship. It is widely recognized that entrepreneurship is somehow important, but there is little 
consensus about how the entrepreneurial role should be modeled and incorporated into econom-
ics and strategy. Indeed, the most important works in the economic literature on entrepreneur-
ship—Schumpeter’s account of innovation, Knight’s theory of profit, and Kirzner’s analysis of 
entrepreneurial discovery—are viewed as interesting, but idiosyncratic insights that do not easily 
generalize to other contexts and problems. 
The awkward relationship between mainstream economics and entrepreneurship makes sense 
in the context of the development of the neoclassical theory of production and the firm. The in-
creasingly formalized treatment of markets, notably in the form of general equilibrium theory, 
not only made firms increasingly “passive,” it also made the model of the firm increasingly styl-
ized and anonymous, doing away with those dynamic aspects of markets that are most closely 
related to entrepreneurship (O’Brien, 1984). In particular, the development of what came to be 
known as the “production function view” (Williamson, 1985; Langlois and Foss, 1999)—
roughly, the firm as it is presented in intermediate microeconomics textbooks with its fully 
transparent production possibility sets—was a deathblow to the economic theory of entrepre-
neurship. If any firm can do what any other firm does (Demsetz, 1988), if all firms are always on 
their production possibility frontiers, and if firms always make optimal choices of input combi-
nations and output levels, then there is nothing for the entrepreneur to do. Even in more ad-
vanced models of asymmetric production functions, hidden characteristics, and strategic interac-
tion, firms or agents are modeled as behaving according to fixed rules subject to formalization by 
the analyst. The entrepreneur makes an occasional appearance in business history and in Schum-
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peterian models of innovation and technical change, but is largely absent from contemporary 
economic theory. 
One exception is the “Austrian” school of economics, which has given the entrepreneur a 
central role in the economy at least since the proto-Austrian contribution of Richard Cantillon 
(1755). Key figures in the Austrian school such as Carl Menger (1871), Eugen von Böhm-
Bawerk (1889), Ludwig von Mises (1949), and Murray Rothbard (1962) all emphasized the en-
trepreneur in their “causal-realistic” analysis of economic organization and economic change. 
More recently, the Austrian economist Israel Kirzner has popularized the notion of entrepreneur-
ship as discovery, or alertness to profit opportunities. Kirzner’s interpretation of Mises has been 
highly influential, not only within the Austrian school but also in the “opportunity-discovery” or 
opportunity-recognition branch of the entrepreneurship literature (Shane and Venkataraman, 
2000; Gaglio and Katz, 2001; Shane, 2003).  
However, as described below, the opportunity-discovery framework is problematic as a 
foundation for applied entrepreneurship research. Its central concept, the “opportunity,” was in-
tended by theorists such as Kirzner to be used instrumentally, or metaphorically, as a means of 
explaining the tendency of markets to equilibrate, and not meant to be treated literally as the ob-
ject of analysis. I argue that entrepreneurship can be more thoroughly grounded, and more close-
ly linked to theories of economic organization and strategy, by adopting the Cantillon-Knight-
Mises understanding of entrepreneurship as judgment, along with the Austrian’s school’s subjec-
tivist account of capital heterogeneity. The judgment approach emphasizes that profit opportuni-
ties do not exist, objectively, when decisions are made, because the result of action cannot be 
known with certainty. Opportunities are essentially subjective phenomena (Foss, Klein, Kor, and 
Mahoney, 2008). As such, opportunities are neither “discovered” nor “created” (Alvarez and 
Barney, 2007), but imagined. They exist, in other words, only in the minds of decision-makers. 
Moreover, the essentially subjective character of profit opportunities poses special challenges for 
applies research on the cognitive psychological aspects of discovery. Rather, I argue, opportuni-
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ties can be treated as a latent concept underlying the real phenomenon of interest, namely entre-
preneurial action.  
I begin by distinguishing among occupational, structural, and functional approaches to entre-
preneurship and explaining two influential interpretations of the entrepreneurial function, dis-
covery and judgment. I turn next to the contemporary literature on opportunity identification, 
arguing that this literature misinterprets Kirzner’s instrumental use of the discovery metaphor 
and mistakenly makes opportunities the unit of analysis. Instead, I describe an alternative ap-
proach in which investment is the unit of analysis and link this approach to the theory of hetero-
geneous capital theory. I close with some applications to organizational form and entrepreneurial 
teams. 
Entrepreneurship: occupational, structural, and functional perspectives 
To organize the various strands of entrepreneurship literature it is useful to distinguish 
among occupational, structural, and functional perspectives. Occupational theories define entre-
preneurship as self- employment and treat the individual as the unit of analysis, describing the 
characteristics of individuals who start their own businesses and explaining the choice between 
employment and self-employment (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979; Shaver and Scott, 1991; Parker, 
2004). The labor economics literature on occupational choice, along with psychological literature 
on the personal characteristics of self-employed individuals, fits in this category. For example, 
McGrath and MacMillan (2000) argue that particular individuals have an “entrepreneurial mind-
set” that enables and encourages them to find opportunities overlooked or ignored by others (and 
that this mindset is developed through experience, rather than formal instruction). Structural ap-
proaches treat the firm or industry as the unit of analysis, defining the “entrepreneurial firm” as a 
new or small firm. The literatures on industry dynamics, firm growth, clusters, and networks 
have in mind a structural concept of entrepreneurship (Aldrich, 1990; Acs and Audretsch, 1990; 
Audretsch, Keilbach, and Lehmann, 2005). Indeed, the idea that one firm, industry, or economy 
can be more “entrepreneurial” than another suggests that entrepreneurship is associated with a 
particular market structure (i.e., lots of small or young firms). 
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By contrast, the classic contributions to the economic theory of entrepreneurship from 
Schumpeter, Knight, Mises, Kirzner, and others model entrepreneurship as a function, activity, or 
process, not an employment category or market structure. The entrepreneurial function has been 
characterized in various ways: judgment (Cantillon, 1755; Knight, 1921; Casson, 1982; Langlois 
and Cosgel, 1993; Foss and Klein, 2005), innovation (Schumpeter, 1911), adaptation (Schultz, 
1975, 1982), alertness (Kirzner, 1973, 1979, 1992), and coordination (Witt 1998a, 1998b, 2003). 
In each case, these functional concepts of entrepreneurship are largely independent of occupa-
tional and structural concepts. The entrepreneurial function can be manifested in large and small 
firms, in old and new firms, by individuals or teams, across a variety of occupational categories, 
and so on. By focusing too narrowly on self-employment and start-up companies, the contempo-
rary literature may be understating the role of entrepreneurship in the economy and in business 
organization. 
Kirzner’s (1973, 1979, 1992) concept of entrepreneurship as “alertness” to profit opportuni-
ties is one of the most influential functional approaches. The simplest case of alertness is that of 
the arbitrageur, who discovers a discrepancy in present prices that can be exploited for financial 
gain. In a more typical case, the entrepreneur is alert to a new product or a superior production 
process and steps in to fill this market gap before others. Success, in this view, comes not from 
following a well–specified maximization problem, but from having some insight that no one else 
has, a process that cannot be modeled as an optimization problem.1 Because Kirzner’s entrepre-
neurs perform only a discovery function, rather than an investment function, they do not own 
capital; they need only be alert to profit opportunities. They own no assets, they bear no uncer-
tainty, and hence they cannot earn losses—the worst that can happen to an entrepreneur is the 
failure to discover an existing profit opportunity. For these reasons, the link between Kirznerian 
entrepreneurship and other branches of economic analysis, such as industrial organization, inno-
                                                 
1 Kirzner is careful to distinguish alertness from systematic search, as in Stigler’s (1961, 1962) analysis of searching 
for bargains or for jobs. A nice example is provided by Ricketts (1987, p. 58): “Stigler’s searcher decides how much 
time it is worth spending rummaging through dusty attics and untidy drawers looking for a sketch which (the family 
recalls) Aunt Enid thought might be by Lautrec. Kirzner’s entrepreneur enters a house and glances lazily at the pic-
tures which have been hanging in the same place for years. ‘Isn't that a Lautrec on the wall?’” 
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vation, and the theory of the firm, is weak. Hence Kirzner’s concept has not generated a large 
body of applications.2 
An alternative account treats entrepreneurship as judgmental decision making under condi-
tions of uncertainty. Judgment refers primarily to business decision making when the range of 
possible future outcomes, let alone the likelihood of individual outcomes, is generally unknown 
(what Knight terms uncertainty, rather than mere probabilistic risk). This view finds expression 
in the earliest known discussion of entrepreneurship, that found in Richard Cantillon’s Essai sur 
la nature de commerce en géneral (1755). Cantillon argues that all market participants, with the 
exception of landowners and the nobility, can be classified as either entrepreneurs or wage earn-
ers:  
Entrepreneurs work for uncertain wages, so to speak, and all others for certain 
wages until they have them, although their functions and their rank are very dis-
proportionate. The General who has a salary, the Courtier who has a pension, and 
the Domestic who has wages, are in the latter class. All the others are Entrepre-
neurs, whether they establish themselves with a capital to carry on their enter-
prise, or are Entrepreneurs of their own work without any capital, and they may 
be considered as living subject to uncertainty; even Beggars and Robbers are En-
trepreneurs of this class (Cantillon, p. 54). 
Judgment is distinct from boldness, innovation, alertness, and leadership. Judgment must be 
exercised in mundane circumstances, for ongoing operations as well as new ventures. Alertness 
is the ability to react to existing opportunities while judgment refers to beliefs about new oppor-
tunities.3 Those who specialize in judgmental decision making may be dynamic, charismatic 
leaders, but they need not possess these traits. In short, in this view, decision making under un-
                                                 
2 Exceptions include Ekelund and Saurman (1988), Holcombe (1992), Harper (1995), and Sautet (2001). 
3 In Kirzner’s treatment, entrepreneurship is characterized as “a responding agency. I view the entrepreneur not as a 
source of innovative ideas ex nihilo, but as being alert to the opportunities that exist already and are waiting to be 
noticed” (Kirzner, 1973, p. 74). Of course, as Kirzner (1985, pp. 54–59) himself emphasizes, the actions of entre-
preneurs in the present affect the constellation of possible profit opportunities in the future. “[Alertness] does not 
consist merely in ‘seeing’ the unfolding of the tapestry of the future in the sense of seeing a preordained flow of 
events. Alertness must, importantly, embrace the awareness of the ways the human agent can, by imaginative, bold 
leaps of faith, and determination, in fact create the future for which his present acts are created.” However, Kirzner 
(1985, p. 57) continues, the only opportunities that matter for equilibration are those that do, in fact, “bear some 
realistic resemblance to the future as it will be realized.”  
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certainty is entrepreneurial, whether it involves imagination, creativity, leadership, and related 
factors or not. 
Knight introduces judgment to link profit and the firm to uncertainty. Entrepreneurship 
represents judgment that cannot be assessed in terms of its marginal product and which cannot, 
accordingly, be paid a wage (Knight, p. 311). In other words, there is no market for the judgment 
that entrepreneurs rely on, and therefore exercising judgment requires the person with judgment 
to start a firm. Judgment thus implies asset ownership, for judgmental decision making is ulti-
mately decision making about the employment of resources. An entrepreneur without capital 
goods is, in Knight’s sense, no entrepreneur (Foss and Klein, 2005).4 
Entrepreneurship as uncertainty bearing is also important for Mises’s theory of profit and 
loss, a cornerstone of his well–known critique of economic planning under socialism. Mises be-
gins with the marginal productivity theory of distribution developed by his Austrian predeces-
sors. In the marginal productivity theory, laborers earn wages, capitalists earn interest, and own-
ers of specific factors earn rents. Any excess (deficit) of a firm’s realized receipts over these fac-
tor payments constitutes profit (loss). Profit and loss, therefore, are returns to entrepreneurship. 
In a hypothetical equilibrium without uncertainty (what Mises calls the “evenly rotating econ-
omy”), capitalists would still earn interest, as a reward for lending, but there would be no profit 
or loss. 
Entrepreneurs, in Mises’s understanding of the market, make their production plans based on 
the current prices of factors of production and the anticipated future prices of consumer goods. 
What Mises calls “economic calculation” is the comparison of these anticipated future receipts 
with present outlays, all expressed in common monetary units. Under socialism, the absence of 
                                                 
4 It is useful here to distinguish between broad and narrow notions of (Knightian) entrepreneurship. All human ac-
tion involves judgment, and in an uncertain world, all action places some assets at risk (at minimum, the opportunity 
cost of the actor’s time). In Mises’s terminology, human action is the purposeful employment of means to bring 
about desired ends, which may or may not be realized. In this sense, we are all entrepreneurs, every day. Of course, 
this broad concept of entrepreneurship is not particularly operational, or empirically important. Economics and or-
ganization theorists therefore tend to focus on a narrower concept of entrepreneurship, namely the actions of the 
businessperson, the investment of tangible resources in pursuit of commercial gain. In the discussion that follows I 
focus on this narrower, commercial notion of entrepreneurship.  
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factor markets, and the consequent lack of factor prices, renders economic calculation—and 
hence rational economic planning—impossible. Mises’s point is that a socialist economy may 
assign individuals to be workers, managers, technicians, inventors, and the like, but it cannot, by 
definition, have entrepreneurs, because there are no money profits and losses. Entrepreneurship, 
and not labor or management or technological expertise, is the crucial element of the market 
economy. As Mises puts it: directors of socialist enterprises may be allowed to “play market,” to 
make capital investment decisions as if they were allocating scarce capital across activities in an 
economizing way, but entrepreneurs cannot be asked to “play speculation and investment” (Mis-
es, 1949, p. 705). Without entrepreneurship, a complex, dynamic economy cannot allocate re-
sources to their highest valued use. 
Entrepreneurship as opportunity identification 
While Schumpeter, Kirzner, Cantillon, Knight, and Mises are frequently cited in the contem-
porary entrepreneurship literature in economics and management (Schultz, by contrast, is rarely 
cited), much of this literature takes, implicitly, an occupational or structural approach to entre-
preneurship. Any relationship to the classic functional contributions is inspirational, not substan-
tive.  
The most important exception is the literature in management and organization theory on op-
portunity discovery or opportunity identification, or what Shane (2003) calls the “individual–
opportunity nexus.” Opportunity identification involves not only technical skills like financial 
analysis and market research, but also less tangible forms of creativity, team building, problem 
solving, and leadership (Long and McMullan, 1984; Hills, Lumpkin, and Singh, 1997; Hindle, 
2004). While value can of course be created not only by starting new activities, but also by im-
proving the operation of existing activities, research in opportunity identification tends to em-
phasize new activities. These could include creating a new firm or starting a new business ar-
rangement, introducing a new product or service, or developing a new method of production. As 
summarized by Shane (2003, p. 4–5):  
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Entrepreneurship is an activity that involves the discovery, evaluation, and exploi-
tation of opportunities to introduce new goods and services, ways of organizing, 
markets, process, and raw materials through organizing efforts that previously had 
not existed (Venkataraman, 1997; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Given this 
definition, the academic field of entrepreneurship incorporates, in its domain, ex-
planations for why, when and how entrepreneurial opportunities exist; the sources 
of those opportunities and the forms that they take; the processes of opportunity 
discovery and evaluation; the acquisition of resources for the exploitation of these 
opportunities; the act of opportunity exploitation; why, when, and how some indi-
viduals and not others discover, evaluate, gather resources for and exploit oppor-
tunities; the strategies used to pursue opportunities; and the organizing efforts to 
exploit them (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). 
This conception is admirably broad, incorporating not only opportunity discovery, but also 
the processes by which opportunities are pursued and exploited. What unifies these varied as-
pects of the entrepreneurial function is the concept of the opportunity. The discovery and (poten-
tial) exploitation of opportunities is proposed as the unit of analysis for entrepreneurship re-
search. But what exactly are opportunities? How are they best characterized? How much explicit 
characterization is necessary for applied research in entrepreneurial organization and strategy? 
Opportunities: objective or subjective? 
Shane and Venkataraman (2000, p. 220) define entrepreneurial opportunities as “those situa-
tions in which new goods, services, raw materials, and organizing methods can be introduced 
and sold at greater than their cost of production.” These opportunities are treated as objective 
phenomena, though their existence is not known to all agents. Shane and Venkataraman also dis-
tinguish entrepreneurial opportunities from profit opportunities more generally. While the latter 
reflect opportunities to create value by enhancing the efficiency of producing existing goods, 
services, and processes, the former refer to value creation through “the discovery of new means-
ends frameworks.” Shane and Venkataraman seem to have in mind the distinction between ac-
tivities that can be modeled as solutions to well-specified optimization problems—what Kirzner 
(1973) calls “Robbinsian maximizing”—and those for which no existing model, or decision rule, 
is available.  
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However, Shane and Venkataraman appear to misunderstand Kirzner (and the Austrians 
more generally) on this point. In a world of Knightian uncertainty, all profit opportunities in-
volve decisions for which no well-specified maximization problem is available. Kirzner does not 
mean that some economic decisions really are the result of Robbinsian maximizing while others 
reflect discovery. Instead, Kirzner is simply contrasting two methodological constructions for the 
analysis of human action.  
More generally, the opportunity identification literature seeks to build a positive research 
program by operationalizing the concept of alertness. How is alertness manifested in action? 
How do we recognize it, empirically? Can we distinguish “discovery” from systematic search? 
As summarized by Gaglio and Katz (2001): 
Almost all of the initial empirical investigations of alertness have focused on the 
means by which an individual might literally “notice without search.” For exam-
ple, Kaish and Gilad (1991) interpret this as having an aptitude to position oneself 
in the flow of information so that the probability of encountering opportunities 
without a deliberate search for a specific opportunity is maximized. Therefore, in 
their operational measures of alertness, they asked founders to recall: (a) the 
amount of time and effort exerted in generating an information flow; (b) the selec-
tion of information sources for generating an information flow; and (c) the cues 
inherent in information that signal the presence of an opportunity. From this data 
the authors deduced: (d) the quantity of information in the flow and (e) the 
breadth and diversity of information in the flow. 
Their results conform to expectations in some ways but also reveal some unex-
pected patterns. Compared to the sample of corporate executives, the sample of 
new venture founders do appear to spend more time generating an information 
flow and do seem more likely to use unconventional sources of information. In-
terestingly, the founders do seem more attentive to risk cues rather than to market 
potential cues. However, the data also reveal that only inexperienced or unsuc-
cessful founders engage in such intense information collection efforts. Successful 
founders actually behave more like the sample of corporate executives. Cooper et 
al. (1995) found a similar pattern of results in their survey of 1100 firms although 
Busenitz (1996), in an altered replication of Kaish and Gilad's survey, did not. In-
deed Busenitz found few significant differences between corporate managers and 
new venture founders. In addition, validity checks of the survey measures yielded 
low reliability scores, which led the author to conclude that future research in 
alertness required improved theoretical and operational precision. 
This positive research program misses, however, the point of Kirzner’s metaphor of entre-
preneurial alertness: namely, that it is only a metaphor. Kirzner’s aim is not to characterize en-
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trepreneurship per se, but to explain the tendency for markets to clear. In the Kirznerian system 
opportunities are (exogenous) arbitrage opportunities and nothing more. Entrepreneurship itself 
serves a purely instrumental function; it is the means by which Kirzner explains market clearing. 
Of course, arbitrage opportunities cannot exist in a perfectly competitive general-equilibrium 
model, so Kirzner’s framework assumes the presence of competitive imperfections, to use the 
language of strategic factor markets (Barney, 1986; Alvarez and Barney, 2004). Beyond specify-
ing general disequilibrium conditions, however, Kirzner offers no theory of how opportunities 
come to be identified, who identifies them, and so on; identification itself is a black box. The 
claim is simply that outside the Arrow–Debreu world in which all knowledge is effectively pa-
rameterized, opportunities for disequilibrium profit exist and tend to be discovered and exploited. 
In short, what Kirzner calls “entrepreneurial discovery” is simply that which causes markets to 
equilibrate.5 
Contemporary entrepreneurship scholars, considering whether opportunities are objective or 
subjective (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006; Companys and McMullen, 2007), note that Kirzner 
tends to treat them as objective. Again, this is true, but misses the point. Kirzner is not making an 
ontological claim about the nature of profit opportunities per se—not claiming, in other words, 
that opportunities are, in some fundamental sense, objective—but merely using the concept of 
objective, exogenously given, but not-yet-discovered opportunities as a device for explaining the 
tendency of markets to clear.6  
The Knightian perspective also treats entrepreneurship as an instrumental construct, used 
here to decompose business income into two constituent elements, interest and profit. Interest is 
a reward for forgoing present consumption, is determined by the relative time preferences of bor-
                                                 
5 The foregoing description applies primarily to what Kirzner calls the “pure entrepreneur.” As he explains, flesh-
and-blood entrepreneurs do not correspond exactly to this ideal type (they can simultaneously be laborers, capital-
ists, consumers, etc.) and they do more than simply discover costless profit opportunities. However, in Kirzner’s 
framework, the attributes of real-world entrepreneurs defy systematic categorization. 
6 Incidentally, the occupational-choice literature cited above treats opportunities, implicitly or explicitly, as objec-
tive. Agents are assumed to compare the expected benefits of employment and self-employment, meaning that the 
set of possible entrepreneurial outcomes must be fixed and the probability weights assigned to individual outcomes 
known in advance. 
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rowers and lenders, and would exist even in a world of certainty. Profit, by contrast, is a reward 
for anticipating the uncertain future more accurately than others (e.g., purchasing factors of pro-
duction at market prices below the eventual selling price of the product), and exists only in a 
world of “true” uncertainty. In such a world, given that production takes time, entrepreneurs will 
earn either profits or losses based on the differences between factor prices paid and product pric-
es received.  
For Knight, in other words, opportunities do not exist, waiting to be discovered (and hence, 
by definition, exploited). Rather, entrepreneurs invest resources based on their expectations of 
future consumer demands and market conditions, investments that may or may not yield positive 
returns. Here the focus is not on opportunities, but on investment and uncertainty. Expectations 
about the future are inherently subjective and, under conditions of uncertainty rather than risk, 
constitute judgments that are not themselves modelable. Put differently, subjectivism implies that 
opportunities do not exist, in an objective sense. Hence a research program based on formalizing 
and studying empirically the cognitive or psychological processes leading individuals to discover 
opportunities captures only a limited aspect of the entrepreneurial process. Opportunities for en-
trepreneurial gain are thus inherently subjective, in the sense that they do not exist until profits 
are realized. Entrepreneurship research may be able to realize higher marginal returns by focus-
ing on entrepreneurial action, rather than its presumed antecedents.7 
Alvarez and Barney (2007) argue that entrepreneurial objectives, characteristics, and deci-
sion-making differ systematically depending on whether opportunities are modeled as discovered 
or created. In the “discovery approach,” for example, entrepreneurial actions are responses to 
exogenous shocks, while in the “creation approach,” such actions are endogenous. Discovery 
entrepreneurs focus on predicting systematic risks, formulating complete and stable strategies, 
and procuring capital from external sources. Creation entrepreneurs, by contrast, appreciate itera-
                                                 
7 Here I follow Gul and Pesendorfer’s (2005) more general critique of neuroeconomics, namely that cognitive psy-
chology and economics “address different questions, utilize different abstractions, and address different types of 
empirical evidence,” meaning that the two disciplines are in essentially different, though potentially complementary, 
domains. In other words, understanding the cognitive processes underlying entrepreneurial behavior may be interest-
ing and important, but not necessary for the economic analysis of the behavior itself. 
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tive, inductive, incremental decision making, are comfortable with emergent and flexible strate-
gies, and tend to rely on internal finance.8  
The approach proposed here is close to Alvarez and Barney’s creation approach, but differs 
in that it places greater emphasis on the ex post processes of resource assembly and personnel 
management rather than the ex ante processes of cognition, expectations formation, and business 
planning. Moreover, Alvarez and Barney write as if “discovery settings” and “creation settings” 
are actual business environments within which entrepreneurs operate. Some entrepreneurs really 
do discover exogenously created profit opportunities while others have to work creatively to es-
tablish them. As I read Knight and Kirzner, by contrast, both the discovery and creation perspec-
tives are purely metaphorical concepts, useful for the economist or management theorist, not 
frameworks for entrepreneurial decision-making itself. This suggests that opportunities are best 
characterized neither as discovered nor created, but imagined. The creation metaphor implies that 
profit opportunities, once the entrepreneur has conceived or established them, come into being, 
objectively, like a work of art. Creation implies that something is created. There is no uncertainty 
about its existence or characteristics (though of course its market value may not be known until 
later). By contrast, the concept of opportunity imagination emphasizes that gains (and losses) to 
not come into being, objectively, until entrepreneurial action is complete (i.e., until final goods 
and services have been produced and sold).9  
Moreover, explaining entrepreneurial loss is awkward using both discovery and creation lan-
guage. In Kirzner’s formulation, for example, the worst that can happen to an entrepreneur is the 
failure to discover an existing profit opportunity. Entrepreneurs either earn profits or break even, 
but it is unclear how they suffer losses. Kirzner (1997, p. 72) does claim that entrepreneurs can 
earn losses when they misread market conditions. “[E]ntrepreneurial boldness and imagination 
                                                 
8 Miller (2007) distinguishes further between opportunity recognition, opportunity discovery, and opportunity crea-
tion.  
9 The concept of “opportunity imagination” calls to mind Boulding’s (1956) notion of “image,” defined as “the sum 
of what we think we know and what makes us behave the way we do.” Human action, in Boulding’s framework, is a 
response to the actor’s (subjective) image of reality. This does not mean that images are completely detached from 
reality, but that reality is filtered, or interpreted, by the actor’s subjective beliefs. Penrose’s (1959) concept of the 
firm’s “subjective opportunity set” also reflects entrepreneurial imagination, in this sense (Kor, Michael, and Ma-
honey, 2007). 
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can lead to pure entrepreneurial losses as well as to pure profit. Mistaken actions by entrepre-
neurs mean that they have misread the market, possibly pushing price and output constellations 
in directions not equilibrative.” But even this formulation makes it clear that it is mistaken ac-
tions—not mistaken discoveries—that lead to loss. Misreading market conditions leads to losses 
only if the entrepreneur has invested resources in a project based on this misreading. It is the 
failure to anticipate future market conditions correctly that causes the loss. It seems obscure to 
describe this as erroneous discovery, rather than unsuccessful uncertainty bearing. 
Likewise, realized entrepreneurial losses to not fit naturally within a creation framework. Al-
varez and Barney (2007) emphasize that “creation entrepreneurs” do take into account potential 
losses, the “acceptable losses” described by Sarasvathy (2001). “[A]n entrepreneur engages in 
entrepreneurial actions when the total losses that can be created by such activities are not too 
large” (Alvarez and Barney, 2007, p. 19). However, when those losses are realized, it seems 
more straightforward to think in terms of mistaken beliefs about the future—expected prices and 
sales revenues that did not, in fact, materialize—then the “disappearance” of an opportunity that 
was previously created. Entrepreneurs do not, in other words, “create” the future, they “imagine” 
it, and their imagination can be wrong as often as it is right.10 
Opportunities as a black box 
Confusion over the nature of opportunities is increasingly recognized. As noted by McMul-
len, Plummer, and Acs (2007, p. 273),  
a good portion of the research to date has focused on the discovery, exploitation, 
and consequences thereof without much attention to the nature and source of op-
portunity itself. Although some researchers argue that the subjective or socially 
constructed nature of opportunity makes it impossible to separate opportunity 
from the individual, others contend that opportunity is as an objective construct 
visible to or created by the knowledgeable or attuned entrepreneur. Either way, a 
                                                 
10 To go from judgment to an explanation for market efficiency requires assumptions about the tendency of entre-
preneurial judgments to be correct. Mises’s (1951) explanation is based on a kind of natural namely that market 
competition rewards those entrepreneurs whose judgments tend to be better than the judgments of their fellow entre-
preneurs. Of course, one needn’t go as far as Friedman (1953) in assuming that the result is “optimal” behavior, in 
the neoclassical economist’s sense of optimality, to defend the effectiveness of this selection process.  
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set of weakly held assumptions about the nature and sources of opportunity ap-
pear to dominate much of the discussion in the literature. 
Do we need a precise definition of opportunities to move forward? Can one do entrepreneur-
ship research without specifying what, exactly, entrepreneurial opportunities “are”? Can we treat 
opportunities as a “black box,” much as other concepts in management such as culture, leader-
ship, routines, capabilities, and the like are treated (Abell, Felin, and Foss, 2007)? 
One approach is to focus not on what opportunities are, but what opportunities do. Opportu-
nities, in this sense, are treated as a latent construct that is manifested in entrepreneurial action—
investment, creating new organizations, bringing products to market, and so on. A direct analogy 
can be drawn to the economist’s notion of preferences. Economic theory (with the exception of 
behavioral economics, discussed below) takes agents’ preferences as given and derives implica-
tions for choice. The economist does not care what preferences “are,” ontologically, but simply 
postulates their existence and draws inferences about their characteristics as needed to explain 
particular kinds of economic behavior. Empirically, this approach can be operationalized by 
treating entrepreneurship as a latent variable in a structural-equations framework (Xue and Klein, 
2007). 
By treating opportunities as a latent construct, this approach sidesteps the problem of defin-
ing opportunities as objective or subjective, real or imagined, and so on. The formation of entre-
preneurial beliefs is treated as a potentially interesting psychological problem, but not part of the 
economic analysis of entrepreneurship. It also avoids thorny questions about whether alertness or 
judgment is simply luck (Demsetz, 1983), a kind of intuition (Dane and Pratt, 2007), or some-
thing else entirely. 
The unit of analysis 
As explained above, the opportunity-creation approach proposed by Alvarez and Barney 
(2007) differs in important ways from the opportunity-discovery approach. The creation ap-
proach treats opportunities as the result of entrepreneurial action. Opportunities do not exist ob-
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jectively, ex ante, but are created, ex nihilo, as entrepreneurs act based on their subjective beliefs. 
“Creation opportunities are social constructions that do not exist independent of entrepreneur’s 
perceptions” (Alvarez and Barney, 2007, p. 15). In this sense, the creation approach sounds like 
the imagination approach described here. Still, like the discovery approach, the creation ap-
proach makes the opportunity the unit of analysis. How entrepreneurs create opportunities, and 
how they subsequently seek to exploit those opportunities, is the focus of the research program. 
At one level, the distinction between opportunity creation and opportunity imagination seems 
semantic. Both hold that entrepreneurs act based on their beliefs about future gains and losses, 
rather than reacting to objective, exogenously given opportunities for profit. There are some on-
tological and epistemological differences, however. The creation approach is grounded in a so-
cial constructivist view of action (Alvarez and Barney, 2007, pp. 15–16). It holds that the market 
itself is a social construction, and that realized gains and losses are, in part, subjective. The im-
agination approach described here is, in this sense, less subjectivist than the creation approach. It 
is tied closely to Mises’s (1912, 1920) concept of monetary calculation, in which realized gains 
and losses are objective and quantifiable, and used to filter, or select, the quality of entrepreneu-
rial expectations and beliefs. It is compatible with a range of ontological positions, from evolu-
tionary realism to critical realism (Lawson, 1997; Mäki, 1996) to Misesian praxeology (Mises, 
1949).  
An alternative way to frame a subjectivist approach to entrepreneurship, emphasizing uncer-
tainty and the passage of time, is to drop the concept of “opportunity” altogether. If opportunities 
are inherently subjective, and we treat them as a black box, then the unit of analysis should not 
be opportunities, but rather some action—in Knightian terms, the assembly of resources in the 
present in anticipation of (uncertain) receipts in the future. Again, the analogy with preferences 
in microeconomic theory is clear: the unit of analysis in consumer theory is not preferences but 
consumption, while in neoclassical production theory the unit of analysis is not the production 
function but some decision variable.  
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Alternatively, one could view opportunities and actions as distinct, but complementary, as-
pects of the entrepreneurial process. To use Alvarez and Barney’s (2007) terminology, the dis-
covery perspective treats actions as responses to opportunities, while the creation perspective 
treats opportunities as the result of action. By contrast, the perspective outlined here treats oppor-
tunities as a superfluous concept, once action is taken into account. Opportunities exist only as 
manifested in action, and are neither its cause nor consequence of action. Hence we can dispense 
with the very notion of opportunities itself and focus on the actions that entrepreneurs take and 
the results of those actions. 
One way to capture the Knightian concept of entrepreneurial action is Casson’s notion of 
“projects” (Casson, 2007; Casson and Wadeson, 2007). A project is a stock of resources commit-
ted to particular activities for a specified period of time. Project benefits are uncertain and are 
realized only after projects are completed. Casson and Wadeson (2007, p. 289) model the set of 
potential projects as given, defining opportunities as potential projects that have not yet been 
chosen. As in the discovery-process perspective, the set of opportunities is fixed. However, as 
Casson and Wadeson point out, the assumption of fixed “project possibility sets” is a modeling 
convenience, made necessary by their particular theory of project selection. More generally, the 
use of projects as the unit of analysis is consistent with either the “discovery” or “creation” per-
spective. Focusing on projects, rather than opportunities, implies an emphasis on the actions that 
generate profits and losses. It suggests that entrepreneurship research should focus on the execu-
tion of business plans.  
In this sense, entrepreneurship is closely linked to finance—not simply “entrepreneurial fi-
nance” that studies venture funding and firm formation, but the more general problem of project 
finance under (true) uncertainty. Not only venture capital but also public equity and debt are en-
trepreneurial instruments, in this perspective. Capital budgeting is also a form of entrepreneurial 
decision-making. Of course, contemporary finance theory focuses primarily on equilibrium mod-
els of resource allocation under conditions of risk, not Knightian uncertainty, so entrepreneurship 
theory cannot be simply a reframing of modern finance theory. Instead, a “financiers-as-
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entrepreneurs” approach treats investors not as passive suppliers of capital to decision-making 
firms, but as the locus of economic decision-making itself, as economic agents who experiment 
with resource combinations (Klein and Klein, 2001), develop and exploit network ties (Meyer, 
2000), manage and govern subordinates (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003), and the like. 
Entrepreneurial action, heterogeneous capital, and economic organization 
The close relationship between the Knightian concept of entrepreneurship as action under 
uncertainty and the ownership and control of resources suggests a bridge between entrepreneur-
ship and the mundane activities of establishing and maintaining a business enterprise—what Witt 
(2003) calls the “organizational grind.” Foss and Klein (2005) and Foss, Foss, Klein, and Klein 
(2007) offer an entrepreneurial theory of the economic organization that combines the Knightian 
concept of judgment and the Austrian approach to capital heterogeneity. In Knight’s formulation, 
entrepreneurship represents judgment that cannot be assessed in terms of its marginal product 
and which cannot, accordingly, be paid a wage (Knight 1921: 311). In other words, there is no 
market for the judgment that entrepreneurs rely on, and therefore exercising judgment requires 
the person with judgment to start a firm. Of course, judgmental decision makers can hire con-
sultants, forecasters, technical experts, and so on. However, in doing so they are exercising their 
own entrepreneurial judgment.11 Judgment thus implies asset ownership, for judgmental deci-
sion-making is ultimately decision-making about the employment of resources. The entrepre-
neur’s role, then, is to arrange or organize the capital goods he owns. As Lachmann (1956, p. 16) 
puts it: “We are living in a world of unexpected change; hence capital combinations . . . will be 
ever changing, will be dissolved and reformed. In this activity, we find the real function of the 
entrepreneur.” 12 
                                                 
11 In Foss, Foss, and Klein’s (2007) terminology, the entrepreneur-owner exercises “original” judgment, while hired 
employees, to whom the owner delegates particular decision rights, exercise “derived” judgment as agents of the 
owner. This implies that top corporate managers, whose day-to-day decisions drive the organization of corporate 
resources, are acting only as “proxy-entrepreneurs,” except to the extent that they themselves are part owners 
through equity holdings. 
12 Lachmann (1956) does not require the entrepreneur to own the assets he recombines; see Foss, Foss, Klein, and 
Klein (2007 for a more detailed argument that ownership, as residual rights of control, is a necessary part of this 
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Austrian capital theory provides a unique foundation for an entrepreneurial theory of eco-
nomic organization. Neoclassical production theory, with its notion of capital as a permanent, 
homogeneous fund of value, rather than a discrete stock of heterogeneous capital goods, is of 
little help here.13 Transaction cost, resource-based, and property-rights approaches to the firm do 
incorporate notions of heterogeneous assets, but they tend to invoke the needed specificities in an 
ad hoc fashion to rationalize particular trading problems—for transaction cost economics, asset 
specificity; for capabilities theories, tacit knowledge; and so on. The Austrian approach, starting 
with Menger’s (1871) concepts of higher- and lower-order goods and extending through Böhm-
Bawerk’s (1889) notion of roundaboutness, Lachmann’s (1956) theory of multiple specificities, 
and Kirzner’s (1966) formulation of capital structure in terms of subjective entrepreneurial plans, 
offers a solid foundation for a judgment-based theory of entrepreneurial action. 
One way to operationalize the Austrian notion of heterogeneity is to incorporate Barzel’s 
(1997) idea that capital goods are distinguished by their attributes. Attributes are characteristics, 
functions, or possible uses of assets, as perceived by an entrepreneur. Assets are heterogeneous 
to the extent that they have different, and different levels of, valued attributes. Attributes may 
also vary over time, even for a particular asset. Given Knightian uncertainty, attributes do not 
                                                                                                                                                             
entrepreneurial function. Consider also Marchal’s (1951, pp. 550–51) explanation of the economic return to the en-
trepreneurial function: 
[E]ntrepreneurs obtain remuneration for their activity in a very different manner than do laborers or lenders 
of capital. The latter provide factors of production which they sell to the entrepreneur at prices which they 
naturally try to make as high as possible. The entrepreneur proceeds quite otherwise; instead of selling 
something to the enterprise he identifies himself with the enterprise.. Some people doubtless will say that 
he provides the function of enterprise and receives as remuneration a sum which varies according to the re-
sults. But this is a tortured way of presenting the thing, inspired by an unhealthy desire to establish arbitrar-
ily asymmetry with the other factors. In reality, the entrepreneur and the firm are one and the same. His 
function is to negotiate, or to pay people for negotiating under his responsibility and in the name of the 
firm, with two groups: on the one hand, with those who provide the factors of production, in which case his 
problem is to pay the lowest prices possible; on the other hand, with the buyers of the finished products, 
from which it is desirable to obtain as large a total revenue as possible. To say all this in a few words, the 
entrepreneur, although undeniably providing a factor of production, perhaps the most important one in a 
capitalist system, is not himself to be defined in those terms. 
Marchal expresses, in strong terms, the view described in Foss, Foss, Klein, and Klein (2007) that entrepreneurship 
is embodied in asset ownership (i.e., in the creation and operation of the firm). The entrepreneur is not merely an 
idea man, but rather an owner, who exercises judgment over the capital assets he owns and manages. This contrasts 
with Kirzner’s analytical device of the “pure entrepreneur” who owns no capital. (I thank John Matthews for the 
reference to Marchal.) 
13 Ironically, the notion of capital as a homogeneous fund owes its popularity to Knight (1936). 
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exist objectively, but subjectively, the minds of profit-seeking entrepreneurs who put these assets 
to use in various lines of production. Consequently, attributes are manifested in production deci-
sions and realized only ex post, after profits and losses materialize.14  
Entrepreneurs who seek to create or discover new attributes of capital assets will want own-
ership titles to the relevant assets, both for speculative reasons and for reasons of economizing on 
transaction costs. These arguments provide room for entrepreneurship that goes beyond deploy-
ing a superior combination of capital assets with “given” attributes, acquiring the relevant assets, 
and deploying these to producing for a market: Entrepreneurship may also be a matter of ex-
perimenting with capital assets in an attempt to discover new valued attributes.  
Such experimental activity may take place in the context of trying out new combinations 
through the acquisition of or merger with another firms, or in the form of trying out new combi-
nations of assets already under the control of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur’s success in ex-
perimenting with assets in this manner depends not only on his ability to anticipate future prices 
and market conditions, but also on internal and external transaction costs, the entrepreneur’s con-
trol over the relevant assets, how much of the expected return from experimental activity he can 
hope to appropriate, and so on. Moreover, these latter factors are key determinants of economic 
organization in modern theories of the firm, which suggests that there may be fruitful comple-
mentarities between the theory of economic organization and Austrian theories of capital hetero-
geneity and entrepreneurship.  
Foss, Foss, Klein, and Klein (2007) show how this approach provides new insights into the 
emergence, boundaries, and internal organization of the firm. Firms exist not only to economize 
on transaction costs, but also as a means for the exercise of entrepreneurial judgment, and as a 
low-cost mechanism for entrepreneurs to experiment with various combinations of heterogene-
                                                 
14 As Alchian and Demsetz (1972, p. 793) note, “[e]fficient production with heterogeneous resources is a result not 
of having better resources but in knowing more accurately the relative productive performances of those resources.” 
Contra the production function view in basic neoclassical economics, such knowledge is not given, but has to be 
created or discovered. Even in the literature on opportunity creation and exploitation, in which entrepreneurial ob-
jectives are seen as emerging endogenously from project champions’ creative imaginations, entrepreneurial means 
(resources) are typically taken as given (see, for example, Sarasvathy, 2001). 
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ous capital goods. Changes in firm boundaries can likewise be understood as the result of proc-
esses of entrepreneurial experimentation. And internal organization can be interpreted as the 
means by which the entrepreneur delegates particular decision rights to subordinates who exer-
cise a form of “derived” judgment on his behalf (Foss, Foss, and Klein, 2007).  
Witt (1998a, 1998b) offers another approach to combining an Austrian concept of entrepre-
neurship with the theory of the firm. Entrepreneurs require complementary factors of production, 
he argues, which are coordinated within the firm. For the firm to be successful, the entrepreneur 
must establish a tacit, shared framework of goals—what Casson (2000) calls a “mental model” 
of reality—which governs the relationships among members of the entrepreneur’s team. As Lan-
glois (1998) points out, it is often easier (less costly) for individuals to commit to a specific indi-
vidual, the leader, rather than an abstract set of complex rules governing the firm’s operations. 
The appropriate exercise of charismatic authority, then, facilitates coordination within organiza-
tions (Witt, 2003). This approach combines insights from economics, psychology, and sociology, 
and leans heavily on Max Weber. Leaders coordinate through effective communication, not only 
of explicit information, but also tacit knowledge—plans, rules visions, and the like, what Casson 
(2000) calls “mental models” of reality. The successful entrepreneur excels at communicating 
such models.15 
Here, as in Coase (1937), the employment relationship is central to the theory of the firm. 
The entrepreneur’s primary task is to coordinate the human resources that make up the firm. 
Foss, Foss, Klein, and Klein (2007), by contrast, focus on alienable assets, as in Knight (1921). 
They define the firm as the entrepreneur plus the alienable resources the entrepreneur owns and 
thus controls. Each approach has strengths and weaknesses. The cognitive approach explains the 
dynamics among team members but not necessarily their contractual relationships. Must the cha-
rismatic leader necessarily own physical capital, or can he be an employee or independent con-
tractor? Formulating a business plan, communicating a corporate culture, and the like are clearly 
                                                 
15 Earl’s (2003) “connectionist approach” to entrepreneurship also focuses on coordination, but here the emphasis is 
on coordination among market participants, not within organizations. See also Koppl and Langlois (2001) and Lan-
glois (2002). 
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important dimensions of business leadership. But are they attributes of the successful manager or 
the successful entrepreneur? Even if top-level managerial skill were the same as entrepreneur-
ship, it is unclear why charismatic leadership should be regarded as more “entrepreneurial” than 
other, comparatively mundane managerial tasks such as structuring incentives, limiting oppor-
tunism, administering rewards, and so on. On the other hand, the judgment approach does not 
generalize easily from the one-person firm to the multi-person firm. 
Applications of entrepreneurial action 
Shifting the focus of entrepreneurship research from opportunity identification to entrepre-
neurial action suggests several new issues and directions for entrepreneurship research. 
Opportunities and organizational form 
Distinguishing between opportunity discovery and entrepreneurial action reminds us that the 
two do not always go hand-in-hand. Efforts to encourage the former do not necessarily encour-
age the latter. Generally, efficiency requires that entrepreneurs (and what Foss, Foss, and Klein 
2007 call “proxy-entrepreneurs”) bear the full wealth effects of their actions. For this reason, ef-
forts to promote experimentation, creativity, etc. within the firm can encourage moral hazard un-
less rewards and punishments are symmetric. Outside the firm, strong intellectual-property pro-
tection, incentives for discovery such as SBIR awards, and the like may encourage overspending 
on discovery. The potential waste of resources on “patent races” is a well-known example (Bar-
zel, 1968; Loury, 1979; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; Judd, Schmedders, and Yeltekin, 2003). 
By contrast, if the essence of entrepreneurship is the assembly of resources under uncer-
tainty, then the locus of entrepreneurship is not the generation of creative ideas, but the funding 
of projects. Financiers—venture capitalists, angel investors, banks, family members, even corpo-
rate shareholders—are, in this sense, entrepreneurs. Resource owners possess fundamental judg-
ment rights that, by the nature of ownership, cannot be delegated, no matter how many proximate 
decision rights are delegated to subordinates (Foss, Foss, and Klein, 2007). In this perspective 
even corporate shareholders are treated not as passive suppliers of capital, as they are treated 
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both in neoclassical production theory and in contemporary entrepreneurship theory, but as criti-
cal decision makers.16 
Some applications, such as the staging of venture finance (Gompers, 1995), are obvious. An-
other application is the inherent uncertainty of the gains from corporate takeovers. In the absence 
of uncertainty, one can imagine an equilibrium in which the number of takeovers is suboptimal 
because shareholders will refuse to tender their shares for anything less than their share of the 
post-takeover value of the firm (Scharfstein, 1988). In a world of Knightian uncertainty, how-
ever, the post-takeover value of the firm is uncertain, and many shareholders, not wanting to bear 
this uncertainty, will tender their shares to the “raider” at a price above the pre-takeover share 
value but below the raider’s expected post-takeover price. The raider’s return to a successful 
takeover is thus a form of pure entrepreneurial profit (Klein, 1999, pp. 36–38).  
Note that in this perspective, finance is treated not as an input into the entrepreneurial proc-
ess, but as the very essence of that process. Entrepreneurship is, in other words, manifested in 
investment. Of course, the terms “finance” and “investment” are used here in a broad sense, re-
ferring to the provision not only of financial capital, but also human capital, tangible and intan-
gible resources, and the like—anything that can be considered an input or factor of production. 
Entrepreneurship is conceived as the act of putting resources at risk, with profit as the reward for 
                                                 
16 Jensen (1989) famously distinguished “active” from “passive” investors. Active investors are those “who hold 
large equity or debt positions, sit on boards of directors, monitor and sometimes dismiss management, are involved 
with the long-term strategic direction of the companies they invest in, and sometimes manage the companies them-
selves.” While not denying the importance of this distinction, Foss, Foss, and Klein (2007) argue that residual con-
trol rights make all resource owners “active,” in the sense that they must exercise judgment over the use of their 
resources. In this approach, investors choose how “Jensen-active” they wish to be, which makes them “active” by 
definition. 
Both Rothbard and Kirzner offer similar arguments. Writes Rothbard (1962, p. 538): “Hired managers may suc-
cessfully direct production or choose production processes. But the ultimate responsibility and control of production 
rests inevitably with the owner, with the businessman whose property the product is until it is sold. It is the owners 
who make the decision concerning how much capital to invest and in what particular processes. And particularly, it 
is the owners who must choose the managers. The ultimate decisions concerning the use of their property and the 
choice of the men to manage it must therefore be made by the owners and by no one else.” Kirzner (1973, p. 68) 
makes a similar point about alertness: it can never be fully delegated. “It is true that ‘alertness” . . . may be hired; but 
one who hires an employee alert to possibilities of discovering knowledge has himself displayed alertness of a still 
higher order. . . . The entrepreneurial decision to hire is thus the ultimate hiring decision, responsible in the last re-
sort for all factors that are directly or indirectly hired for his project.” Kirzner goes on to quote Knight (1921, p. 
291): “What we call ‘control’ consists mainly of selecting some one else to do the ‘controlling.’” 
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anticipating future market conditions correctly, or at least more correctly than other entrepre-
neurs. 
Entrepreneurial teams 
Focusing on entrepreneurial action also responds to recent calls to link the theory of entre-
preneurship more closely to the theory of group behavior (Stewart, 1989; Mosakowski, 1998; 
Cook and Plunkett, 2006). Some efforts to develop a theory of team entrepreneurship focus on 
shared mental models, team cognition, and other aspects of the process of identifying opportuni-
ties. Penrose’s (1959) concept of the firm’s “subjective opportunity set” is an obvious link to 
judgment-based theories of entrepreneurship (Kor, Michael, and Mahoney, 2007).17 Entrepre-
neurs can also form networks to share expectations of the potential returns to projects (Greve and 
Salaff, 2003; Parker, 2007). 
On the other hand, even if one views the perception of a (subjectively identified) opportunity 
as an inherently individual act, entrepreneurial action can be a team or group activity. Venture 
capital, later-stage private equity, and bank loans are often syndicated. Publicly traded equity is 
diffusely held. Professional-services firms and closed-membership cooperatives represent jointly 
owned pools of risk capital. Moreover, the firm’s top management team—to whom key decision 
rights are delegated—can be regarded as a bundle of heterogeneous human resources, the inter-
actions among which are critical to the firm’s performance (Foss, Klein, Kor, and Mahoney, 
2008). 
This approach also suggests relationships between the theory of entrepreneurship and the 
theory of collective action (Olson, 1965; Hansmann, 1996). Once an entrepreneurial opportunity 
has been perceived, the entrepreneur may need to assemble a team of investors and/or a man-
agement team, raising problems of internal governance. Shared objectives must be formulated; 
different time horizons must be reconciled; free-riding must be mitigated; and so on. Cook and 
Plunkett (2006) and Chambers (2007) discuss how these problems are addressed within closed-
                                                 
17 Spender (2006) argues that “Penrose’s model of managerial learning [is] an accessible instance of the epistemo-
logical approach proposed by Austrian economists such as Hayek, Kirzner, and Schumpeter.” 
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membership, or “new-generation” cooperatives. Traditionally organized, open-membership co-
operatives suffer from what Cook (1995) calls “vaguely defined property rights.” Because their 
equity shares are not alienable assets that trade in secondary markets, traditional cooperatives 
suffer from a particular set of free-rider, horizon, portfolio, control, and influence costs prob-
lems.18  
In response, a new type of cooperative began to emerge in the 1990s. These new-generation 
cooperatives required up-front equity investments (in traditional cooperatives, equity is gener-
ated ex post, through retained earnings), restricted patronage to member-investors, and allowed 
for limited transferability of investment and delivery rights.19 One of the key challenges in de-
veloping new-generation cooperatives is the establishment of a founding investment team with 
shared objectives and constraints and an effective governing board. According to project cham-
pions—those entrepreneurs who formulated the original vision of the organization—the biggest 
obstacle they faced was convincing other farmer-investors, with whom they had close social ties, 
to invest (Chambers, 2007). In other words, the successful movement from opportunity identifi-
cation to entrepreneurial action depended critically on transaction cost and collective action con-
siderations, social capital, and reputation. Team entrepreneurship, in the Knightian sense de-
scribed above, is a subset of the general theory of economic organization.  
Summary and conclusions 
The arguments presented here suggest that the entrepreneurship literature may have over-
emphasized the origins and characteristics of entrepreneurial opportunities. Instead, opportunities 
can be usefully treated as a latent construct that is manifested in entrepreneurial action, namely 
the exercise of judgment over the arrangement of heterogeneous capital assets. The Austrian the-
ory of capital, interpreted in the “attributes” framework described above, provides a useful 
bridge between the Knightian theory of entrepreneurship and the theory of economic organiza-
                                                 
18 See Cook and Iliopoulos (2000) and Cook and Chaddad (2004) for details.  
19 Cook, Klein, and Chambers (2005) document the emergence of a cluster of new-generation cooperatives in Ren-
ville County, Minnesota. 
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tion. In short, this paper suggests a re-orientation of the entrepreneurship literature toward deeds, 
not words or dreams. In Rothbard’s (1985, p. 283) words: “Entrepreneurial ideas without money 
are mere parlor games until the money is obtained and committed to the projects.” Of course, the 
subjectivist concept of resources is inextricably tied to beliefs—vision, imagination, new mental 
models, if you like—but these beliefs are relevant only to the extent that they are manifest in ac-
tion. 
One objection to this approach is to invoke recent literature in behavioral economics and neu-
roeconomics. This literature takes preferences, not choices, as its unit of analysis, seeking to un-
derstand the psychological basis of preference, the consistency of preferences, and the like, ra-
ther than taking preferences as an irreducible primary. Likewise, a theory of opportunity identifi-
cation could mimic the methods of behavioral economics and neuroeconomics. This is indeed a 
potentially fruitful avenue for entrepreneurship research. However, like behavioral economics, 
such an approach has more in common with applied psychology than economics per se. It may 
contribute to a general, interdisciplinary approach to entrepreneurship, but is not an integral part 
of the economic theory of entrepreneurship (see Gul and Pesendorfer, 2005, for a more general 
argument along these lines). 
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